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The quinquennial drama of staging an omnibus farm bill is supreme political-
economic theater. The leading role is played by Congress which must convince voters and 
taxpayers that transfers from them to farmers with considerably more income and wealth 
makes sense.1 Congress must convince the food, farm, and environmental lobbies that their 
conflicting concerns are being addressed and reconciled. 
The 1990 farm bill may not be a crowd pleaser because interests of the audience 
are too diverse to satisfy. The purpose of this paper is to identify key issues for the 1990 
farm bill and suggest means to address them. Before turning to specific features of a new 
farm bill, we set the background. 
Anderson Professor of Agricultural Marketing, Policy, and Thule and Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus. 
1The useful measwe of farm income and wealth ii that of the minimum adequate-size family farm - sales of $100,000 to 
$250,000. Those farms in 1987 averaged $66,132 of net income and $713,251 of net worth. 
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Background 
Farm Income 
Farm financial stress. was a major policy issue during the debate on the Food Security 
Act of 1985. Net cash farm income had increased only $5.3 billion between 1979 and 1984 
(U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), June 1989), land prices were declining, and farm 
bankruptcies were on the rise. In contrast, prior to deliberations on the 1990 farm bill, 
farm income expanded fully $21 billion between 1983 and 1988. Farm land prices have 
increased 9 percent over their early 1987 lows (USDA, April 1989) and farm bankruptcies 
have declined. 
Because sources of the increase in net cash farm income could influence thinking 
on the farm bill, we examine those sources. We compare cash income and expenses in 1983 
and 1988. Weather confounds any comparison, but we note that both were drought years. 
Gross cash income increased from $150 to $170 billion between 1983 and 1988 
(Table 1 ). Higher crop receipts and government payments each accounted for almost a 
quarter of the increase, while higher livestock receipts comprised nearly half the increase. 
Fruit, nut, vegetable, greenhouse, and nursery crops were responsible for most of the 
increase in crop receipts. In general, both prices and production were higher. The 41 
percent increase in the price index for all fruits is notable. · 
The rise in livestock receipts was centered in cattle, calves, and broilers. Higher 
cattle receipts primarily resulted from 20 percent higher cattle prices and 46 percent higher 
calf prices. Increased poultry receipts reflected 19-percent-higher prices for broilers and 
34 and 54 percent gains in broiler and turkey production, respectively. Dairy and hog cash 
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receipts were smaller, the former because of lower milk price supports due to continuing 
surpluses and the latter because of lower prices. 
The stability in cash expenses was as notabie as the increase in cash receipts (Table 
1). The five-year period between 1983 and 1988 was the first since World War II that cash 
expenses stayed constant. In fact, if the increased expenditures for feeder livestock--whicb 
get captured in higher livestock receipts -- is omitted, cash expenses declined about $5 
billion. In particular, interest and fuel and oil expenses declined. The $4.6 billion decline 
in interest was almost entirely the result of a decline in farm debt -- from $193 to $138 
billion. Average interest rate paid per dollar of debt remained nearly constant at 11 
percent. Smaller fuel and oil expenses reflected an 18 percent decline in prices paid and 
less use. 
Three policy implications can be drawn from this examination. First, farm economic 
health is unlikely to be a major issue in the 1990 farm bill. Second, receipts for crops 
covered by the farm bill (corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, etc.) would have declined if 
government payments had not increased. This observation is not surprising given the thrust 
of the 1985 farm bill -- first lowering loan rates to expand demand, especially exports, then, 
gradually lowering target prices to reduce budgetary costs. Government programs of the 
early 1980s created excess capacity in those commodities which takes time to work off. 
Due to the timing of program payments and the drought of 1988, the initial impact 
of lower target prices will not be felt until the 1989 or 1990 crop year. Thus, the full 
impact of the 1985 farm bill on farm income will not be known until after the 1990 farm 
bill is written. This increases the chance that the 1990 farm bill will have to be rewritten 
sometime soon after its passage, but it will be difficult to generate widespread public 
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support in 1990 for major changes in the farm bill to benefit _the program commodities. 
Table 1. Net Cash Farm Income by Selected Components, U.S. 1983 and 1988. 
Componeni-
Net Cash Income 
Gross Cash Income 
Crops (incl. net CCC loans) 
Target Price Crops 
Oil Crops 
Fruits and Nuts 
Vegetables 
Greenhouse and Nursery 
Other Crops 
Livestock 
Cattle and Calves 
Dairy 
Hogs 
Broilers and Turkeys 
Other Livestock 
Government Payments 
Farm Relatedc 
Cash Expenses 
Farm Origin Inputs 
Livestock 
Manufactured Inputs 
Fuels and Oil 
Interest 
Other Expenses 
1983 
36.9 
150.4 
67.1 
U,.7 
13.S 
6.1 
8.S 
4.S 
7.8 
69.4 
']J!,.7 
18.8 
9.8 
6.1 
6.0 
93 
4.S 
113.S 
33.S 
8.8 
20.9 
1.S 
20.6 
38.S 
($Billion) 
1988" 
58.0 
170.0 
72.0 
24.0 
13.0 
9.0 
10.0 
7.0 
9.0 
78.0 
34.0 
17.0 
9.0 
10.0 
8.0 
14.0 
6.0 
113.0 
36.9 
13.2 
17.6 
4.6 
16.0 
42.5 
SOURCES: USDA, Agricultural Outlook, June 1989. USDA, Agricultural Income and Finance, May 1989. 
"Totals may not equal sum of components due to rounding. 
bForecast. 
CJncome from machine hire, custom work, sales of forest products, and other miscellaneous cash expenses. 
Third, unless demand and hence receipts increase substantially, net cash farm 
income is unlikely to increase as much in the next five year as between 1983 and 1988. 
To be sure, a tighter supply-demand balance could add· to farm income. Excess farm 
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1'rodueti00· capacity is down substantially from the mid~ 1980s (Tweeten, October 1988). 
Yet,. aet income ma~ decline. The reasons are (l) lower government income support le~els 
and (2) increasing expenses because of higher input prices due to general, inflation and 
hecause of higher planted acres due to. increased. demand1 and lowei: stocks. This 
&bsew3*M1 ~ts cost re:ducaon could he a hidden issue in the I~· farm hill' debate: 
Expeeted· averap· annual U.S. farm· ~ort expansion at al'l! average· annual rate of 
3 percent in me 1990s·· and t1m possibility· of an even higher rat« coW.rl:1 create a more 
favorable suppi~d· balance and financial outlook fer U.S. farmers,, suggesting 
opportunities f~r withdrawing government frgm: farm: prim s11ppo1ts fl'weete~ J'anuacy 
1989). History suggests~. however, tlha:t farm prosperity ten.dB to• raise farm. price· suppol'ts 
rather than cover a phase out~ And farm policy must be designed "for alt seasons" because 
J)fedictiom& of the' fuwre are subject to luge error. 
llflematz'onal Trade 
The out¢0ft'le Qf the General Agreement on Tariffs: antdl Trade (GATI) negf>tiatioms, 
~ be eompleted in 1990,, CE>tll'ld materially· imfluence farm1 commodiity legjsl!a:1WE. GA TI 
negotiations, cool:d postpone: a new farm bill until lr99L However, Comgress is lJl;J!llikely t<J 
sacrifice power by allowing a new farm hlll to be dictated by a GA'IT agreemem,t., Hence, 
a farm bill is likely in 1990. 
With Cada Hills the new lJ.S. Trade RepresentatWe under the :emh. Admimmati~ 
with rejection of fuU decoupling. by major trading natiom as evident in the lmeabp of the 
GATI trade mmisters meeting at Montreal in Decembel' 1988,. and with the need to begin 
serious bargaining and eompr0mise if the· Uruguay Roond is to be completed in 1990~ the 
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U.S. shifted its position in early 1989 to accept negotiations on partial reductions in 
agriculture trade barriers and commodity program market distortions without the 
precondition of an agreement to end trade distorting subsidies: That brings the U.S. and 
Cairns group (14 agricultural exporters) positions on trade closer together and isolates 
especially Western Europe as the major impediment to agreement. With the trade 
ministers formally committed to "substantial reductions" in trade distorting agricultural 
policies, the stage would appear to be set for major reform in farm commodity and related 
trade policy. Politics will sharply limit concessions by all parties to negotiations, however. 
The best guess is that GA TI negotiations will result in: 
* 
* 
* 
Reducing export subsidies such as the U.S. Export Enhancement Program 
and Targeted Export Assistance in return for like concessions from the 
European Community. 
A modest (perhaps 10-25 percent) reduction in support levels as measured 
by Producer Subsidy Equivalents (PSEs) spread out over several years.2 
Restrictions against substitution of more for less export enhancing (import 
reducing) market interventions.3 However, programs with generally favorable 
social benefit-cost ratios such as agricultural research, extension, and 
education will be allowed. 
Clayton Yeutter undoubtedly carried from the U.S. Trade Representative position 
to his Secretary of Agriculture position a commitment to freer trade, decoupling, and to 
2PSEs would be evaluated for this purpose at constant prices to avoid the problem of adjusting to a target continually 
moved by current economic conditions. 
3 An exception likely to be favored by the U.S. is allowing substitution of direct payments for supply control. 
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being competitive in international markets. More recent expressions of willingness of the 
U.S. to settle for less than complete decoupling in international trade negotiations probably 
is matched by willingness to a~pt less than full decoupling in U.S. commodity programs. 
However, Secretary Yeutter will resist higher loan rates. 
Federal Btulfet &pendttura 
Between 1950, the first year consistent budget numbers become available, and the 
late 1970tj expenditures on farm programs as a share of total federal outlays and farm 
gros~ cash re~ipt$ trended erratically lower (Figure 1). However, both trends were 
reversed in the 1980s. From filCal year 1981 (FY81) to FY89, farm programs claimed 1.7 
percent of federal outlays, far hi&her than the 0.6 percent from 1974 to 1981 and higher 
~Ven than the 1.6 ptrcent from 1966 through 1973. Also, farm program expenditures 
accounted for 10.3 percent of cash farm marketing receipts between 1982 and 1988, 
compared with 7.6 percent between 1953 and 1964, S.6 percent between 1965 and 1973, and 
2.4 percent between 1974 and 1981. 
Budget projections for the next three fiscal years suggest farm program expenditures 
will claim about 1 percent of federal outlays and provide 6 to 8 percent of cash farm 
marketing receipts. Despite the decline in recent years, these projections are still larger 
than the shares for the last quarter century. 
7 
Percent 
18 
14 
12 
10 
e 
6 
4 
2 
0 § 
... 
i 
... 
Ii 
... ~ 
Year b 
• ,, 
1 ' F'arm Calh Marlcetlft9 Receipt• 
, ' 
, ' 
, ' 
, , ' 
" , ' 
, ' ' ' , ' , ' 
, ' , ' 
, ' , ' 
, ' , ' I I I • 
I ~ I •' 
I 11 
I 1f 
I f 
,, I 
' \ I 
I \ I I ,,, 
I I 
... ... 
•1nc1udes federal expenditures for Commodity Credit Corporation, National Wool Act, and Sugar Act. 
bpor federal expenditures, fiscal year data. For cash marketing receipts, calendar year data. 
SOURCES: Spitze, 1986. 
Executive Office of the President, FJSCal Years 1987-1989. 
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Figure 1. Federal Outlays for Farm Price and Income Support Programs as a Percent of 
Total Budget Outlays and Farm Cash Marketing Receipts, U.S., 1950-1988.• 
Cuts in commodity program expenditures seem especially likely if the debate focuses 
at the individual farm level. Real per-farm cost of farm programs, measured in 1982 dollars 
using the GNP implicit deflator, fluctuated erratically in the $1,000 to $3,500 range between 
1950 and 1981 (Figure 2). Since 1981, expenditures have averaged $5,738, with a peak of 
$10,256 in 1986. Current projections suggest a real per-farm expenditure of $4,000 to 
$5,000 over the next couple of years. To reduce federal expenditures to the high end of the 
1950 to 1980 period, a 10 to 30 percent reduction in farm program expenditures would be 
required. An even larger cut would be needed if average per-farm expenditures were to 
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r:etum, m, tile 1950 to 1980 average. 
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flpn 2. Real Fedeal OUtbsys· for Farm PriCe and lnconae Sappm.rt Propmns. on a: Per 
Farm Buis, u~ 1950-1988.· 
Patt of the luger government share in the 1980s can be attributed: to mrect income 
payments replacing income previously earned through larger cash receipts resulting from 
high. loan rates and production controls. Gwen this chan~. it is difficult to use history to 
project what is a politially sustaiuble claim the farm sector can make on the: federal 
budget. Given recognition that commercial fanning is not a low-income or IO.rate-of-
ret:lml indmiry, die sustainable amount depends partly on how mud1 the public perceives 
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that commodity program outlays bring lower food prices and a more assured food supply. 
While it is too early to definitely conclude what is the impact of lower price supports on 
retail food prices, it is interesting to note that, despite the drop in price support rates 
beginning in 1986, prices paid for food consumed at home by consumers have increased at 
the same rate as general consumer price inflation over this period (Dunham). 
In conclusion, as federal outlays for farm programs have declined from $26 billion 
during FY86 to a projected $10 - 14 billion during FY89-91, the issue of farm program 
cost has declined. However, pressure from Gramm-Rudman-Hollings to reduce the federal 
budget deficit, as well as pressure to fund the savings and loan bailout and new initiatives 
such as child care and alternative fuels, will keep the budget a major issue. The history of 
farm program expenditures and current political dialogue suggest that maintaining currently 
projected commodity expenditures will require considerable political skill by farm interest 
groups. 
Price and Income Support Instruments 
Nonrecourse loans and target prices likely will continue to be principal instruments 
to support and stabilize the farm and food economy. In the search for means to reduce 
government costs of programs while addressing real needs, it is well to review principal 
support instruments' performance in relation to objectives. 
Loan Rate 
The nonrecourse loan rate serves many purposes. It provides price stability by 
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setting the Door for market prices. (An exception is when PIK stocks are released to 
depress prices -- a less likely option with depleted stocks.) The loan rate also establishes 
the degree of reserve capacity: A high loan rate builds stocks and requires acreage 
diversion; a low loan rate leaves excess capacity at zero and stocks in private hands. 
&port markets for major commodities are inelastic in the short run but elastic in 
the long run, hence high loan rates not only price the U.S. out of world markets but also 
reduce receipts from farm exports over time. Many have advocated raising loan rates to 
reduce budget exposure in the 1990 farm bill. The damage to markets from high loan 
rates is apparent from results of the 1981 farm bill. Raising loan rates as market prices 
rose in the 1970s created an unfortunate legacy of lost export markets and of excess 
capacity in the early 1980s. That policy lesson should not go unheeded. 
Figures 3 through 6 provide several observations regarding real price support levels 
and their relationship to market price. (Basic data from U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
April 1989 and earlier issues.) 
• For the four commodities shown in Figures 3 through 6, real loan rates 
increased substantially in the 1970s. (Commodity prices were deflated by the 
implicit deflator of the Gross National Product, 1988=100.) One might expect 
the government to initiate an exit from commodity programs by reduciqg loan 
rates in a time of short supplies, high prices, and minimal excess capacify. 
The opposite appeared to be the case. That is, the gO¥Cmmen:t raised real 
loan rates in the mid-1970s in part to win •cheap11 votes. 
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Figure 3. Real Wheat Price and Support Rates, 1970-1988. 
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Legislators could boast to producers that they voted to raise loan rates, 
believing that the action would not bring additional budget exposure because 
loan rates would not be challenged by market prices. Events subsequently 
proved that a costly miscalculation. 
Real loan rates declined for each of the commodities shown in the 1980s. 
By 1988, real loan rates were lower than in previous years. However, if real 
loan rates were adjusted for productivity, it is not necessarily clear that 
adjusted loan rates would be lower in real terms in 1988 than in the early 
1970s.4 
The market loan provides a direct payment to producers equal to the difference 
between the nonrecourse loan rate and the market price (at least up to a limit), hence it 
encourages the producer to place supplies in the market and avoids stock accumulation. 
The market loan now used for cotton and rice could be utilized for other grains and 
soybeans under FSA85. At issue is whether that would be wise. The market loan converts 
the nonrecourse loan to a direct payment but is not decoupled because the entire output 
on allowable acres is eligible for coverage. The market loan can keep prices competitive 
in international markets, but has several disadvantages: 
1. Foreign competitors strongly object to dumping commodities abroad at prices 
below those received by U.S. producers of those commodities. 
2. The market loan increases budget exposure. Treasury cost can be kept down 
by reducing target prices, however. 
4 Commodity terms of trade measured by the ratio of the index of prices received by fannen to the index of prices paid by 
fannen averaged nearly SO percent of the 1910.14 ratio in the 1980s. Corrected for productivity, however, the parity ratio measured 
by factor terms of trade (real price received per unit of real resoun:es) averaged approximately 160 percent of the 1910.14 ratio (see 
Tweeten, October 1988). 
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3. Incentives for stock accumulation ·may be inadequate, making ,the U.S. :and 
the world vulnerable to inadequate food supplies when weather ii unfavorable. 
4. H the program is not properly managed, it too can lead to ~xcess stocks --
as for cotton in 1'988/89. 
A.t issue is the very purpose of .farm programs and price supports. ke they to he 
,a W:ety net to tide farmers over temporary economic setbacks? Or .are 1hey a ~rmanent 
tr~ze O.fl :which the far.ming economy must always perform. Loan r.ates can he increased 
$0 tempo.rfl.dty r~ Treaswy outlays but at the long-ter.m egpe.ns.e of U~S. comum.ers and 
taKp.ayers. Ther.e is ·merit m ·setting nonreeourse lo.an :rates at 15 per.cent .of a past five--
year moving aver.age of market prices .... a support ley.el low enolJlh to avoid ex.cessiMe sea 
a~cumulation but hijh enoJJih .to r.e.dl.lce SOJae of the :variation in farm prices. 
Target Pril:e and Deficiency Payments 
Much discassion has focused on the target price and prodtwtion base f@r deficiency 
payment$ for 1990's farm legislatioo with an eye on bll<llet sa\"ings and decoupling. The 
real taiget price dedined 26 pereent by 1988 from its peak for whe.at, 19 .per.cent for oom, 
and 18 per"nt for cotton (Figures 3 thr.ough 6). Thus, adjustments can be made m iupport 
rates despite political opposition. 
Whatever the fate of decoupling in GATf, the ~pt of striving for pure transfers 
that do not distort efficient market signals for production, ronswnption, and trade remains 
very much alive. "J)e,eoupliflg" largely refers to direct payments, a commodity program 
approach long favored by eeonomists but lacking support from producers. In theory, a 
ps.yment is decoupled as Ions • program yield and acres on which supports are based do 
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not depend on present or future acreage or production. Whether the new base covers 60, 
80, or 100 percent of the past base makes no difference for decoupling -- if the base is 
unresponsive to present and future decisions. 
Options with a given average annual federal payment to farmres are for the 
deficiency payment foundation to be (1) a high production base acres and low target price 
or (2) a low production base acres and a high target price. The choice of which payment 
strategy to pursue depends on the purpose of programs. If the purpose is to preserve small-
to-mid-size family farms by supplementing income and compensating for their diseconomies 
of size, then the optimal system is high target prices and severely limited base acres on 
which a farm can receive payments. This will give "economies" to small farms but will do 
little to dampen annual variation in gross receipts on commercial farms -- arguably their 
most serious problem. 
On the other hand, if the purpose of programs is to maintain viability of the farm 
production plant by cushioning incomes of all commercial farms from variation in farm 
prices, then the appropriate policy is to allow large bases for target prices covering only 
economic costs of production. There is little or no point in providing target prices above 
all economic costs on all farms and all production because incremental benefits (economic 
rents) are bid into land prices and rents, thus will be eventually lost to hired workers, 
renters, and new landowners. Producers would be paid the difference between the market 
price (or loan rate) and the market price on normal production of the full, historic base.5 
5Blandford ct al. have proposed the Production Entitlement Guarantee (PEG) for the U.S. and other GAIT signatories. 
Deficiency payments will be tied to production only on up to 80 pcn:cnt of a historic base. This proposal contains several 
shortcomings: 
• 
• 
• 
PEG is not decoupled. Producers would have to produce all their base (e.g. 80 pcn:cnt of historic production) 
to be eligible for full payments. The PEG is a production subsidy to that limit. 
PEG docs not avoid the major impediment to adoption of direct payments in Europe and Japan - high costs 
now paid by consumers shifted to reluctant taxpayers who, in the case of the European Community, have already 
revolted against high costs. 
Unsuitability to the U.S. conditions. The U.S. has already progressed beyond PEG in many ways. It allows 
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Payment limitations can be used to restrain the total budget of farm income support 
and stabilization. At the producer level payment limitation is consistent with equity but can 
limit size and efficiency associated with economies of size known to characterize farming 
(see Knutson et al.). Because smaller farms may have substantial off-farm income, payment 
limitations based on crop production do not necessarily target program benefits to the 
needy. 
Focusing more program benefits on mid-size farms requires greater reliance oo 
direct payments and less reliance on supply control. Successful supply control requires 
participation by the large farms accounting for a sizable share of farm output. Price 
enhancement benefits of supply control targeted narrowly to mid-size farms would spill 
over to large and small farms but would require a virtual end to all production on mid-
size farms in a year of considerable excess capacity. 
Narrowly targeting benefits to mid-me and/or smaller farms not only would mean 
foregoing production control and price enhancement policy options, but also would diminish 
the role of program yields and base acreage. Overall output of crops and livestock or total 
production assets are better measures of size than are acreages in production of progµm 
crops~ hence~ the fonner coold be emphasized in targetiDg.. 
If preserving family farm operators is the prime objective of commodity ptograms,. 
another option is to provide payment only to the person engaged in the day-to-day 
operation of a farm. Each farm coukl designate only one opaator. That operator would 
• 
pnxlucen (lllldcr rJ;fR or Sf}/12. options) to ptOduee lea thaa: ttam baa and rcmam eligil:Jle for direct payments. 
PEG could cncounp th dlllllpiq of additional proclgciioa Oii• W'tllM ~ Dumping farm.~ 0n1 
-ia. multets at lea than: pmduction CO&tS litely would be moR: widespread! tliaa; cum:ntly, umk:rstall~ 
tmnging outraF from oompetina exponus who historically 1uwc. not bad lligh suppEll1IS. 
The did ad\lantagc of PEG is. daal. it ia a fi1lm step toward cfecoupliagwllif& ~~· 1IO conm-~s 1iOr se:U"-
aufflCi&N:y. l!lleausc tie latter· is impodant to a Jdatively few countne& suck a Japan;, a usdul: modificatioll of Pm wouAif, be 11& 
allmw cllNilftia. '°' IKlminiltu it eitiber eoupfed. (as all>o\re) or ~ Tile hltlft JllllUdUre WIDUfd male pay,melltS> wliefiu fannei:s 
f~ CH aot.. 'Ebia procedure woul'd be l\10lle aeccptable to ths U.S. wllkb has akacfy moved a long -y ~ dm:luflinc. 
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be subject to payment limitations but he/she could divide the single payment among 
partners as desired. Nonoperator landlords, hired managers, and hired labor would receive 
no payment. Administration of current programs illustrates that payment limitations are 
notoriously difficult to enforce. Targeting of direct payments can delay but not stop the 
shifting of subsidies benefits to landowners through capitalization of benefits into land 
values. 
In summary, a gradual reduction of payments to very large producers over time 
would reduce the immediate shock of tighter payment limitations. However, questions 
would remain regarding (1) the workability of voluntary paid production control programs 
excluding producers who supply most of the output, (2) of punishing large (on average most 
efficient) producers by subsidizing competition of their smaller-farm neighbors, and (3) the 
administrative complexity of enforcing tight payment limitations. To remove incentives for 
raising acreage or yield to obtain more program benefits, an alternative is to freeze program 
yield and acreage base as long as payments are continued. A fixed program average and 
base would be less inducement to produce for the program rather than for the market but 
eventually would provide an unrealistic foundation for controlling production or providing 
direct payments. 
Tieing payments to land encourages operators to remain in farming, and distorts 
market incentives. Allowing payments to attend operators even if they discontinue farming 
would further decouple but might be objectionable to the public. As noted earlier, any 
payments at all increase output, other things equal, because they help to overcome capital 
constraints facing all producers. Thus the ultimate decoupling is to phase out all income 
transfers and price supports. 
18 
Cropping Flexibil.ity 
The 1981 and 1985 farm bills created production rigidities by controlling acreage 
of specific crops. For example, in 1988 too little oats and soybeans were planted relative 
to com. One means to give more flexibility is to continue 1989 program features allowing 
oats to be sub&tituted for other crops and for soybeans or sunflower to be substituted for 
up to 25 percent of program crop base without loss of base. Another option is to return 
to the concept of Normal Cropland Acreage (NCA) used in its most flexible form in the 
early 1970s. Under a flexible NCA, a farmer could set aside to conserving uses a prescribed 
acreage to be eligible for program benefits, and could plant any crop on the remaining 
NCA. 
Current 0/92 and 50/92 provisions raise flexibility by allowing producers to plant 
less than their base with minimal sacrifice of payments and no loss of base. A major 
distortion remains, however. Government programs encourage production of crops with 
the highest target (or loan rate) prices relative to market prices. Table 2 indicates that 
on a typical resource situation in Ohio com produced under commodity programs in 1989 
provided an expected net return of $163 per acre compared to a net of $156 per acre for 
soybeans. Yet soybeans were in very short supply relative to corn. In the absence of a 
program, the market would provide $120 of net return per acre for com, well under the 
market net return of $156 for soybeans. Market price returns are a superior measure of 
scarcity value and social return than returns including government payments. Thus 
programs cause farmers to produce corn already in excess supply when in the absence of 
programs soybeans would be the crop of choice at the margin. 
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Soybeans illustrate how commodity program distortions influence trade. Although 
soybean intervention and support is minimal, the spillover from acreage diversion and 
target prices for other crops has damaged U.S. foreign markets. While the U.S. diverted 
millions of hectares from crop production from 1980 to 1988, Argentina and Brazil filled 
the gap and sharply increased their share of world soybean exports. With a return to NCA 
and continuation of deficiency payments, farmers still would have incentives to produce corn 
or wheat rather than soybeans even if market net returns (excluding deficiency payments) 
were higher for soybeans. 
Table 2. 1989 Production Budgets Per Acre, Conventional Tillage, Ohio. 
Receipts 
Variable Costs 
Return above Variable Costs 
Source: Carter et al. 
Corn 
(120 bu/ac) 
No Program Program 
$270 
150 
120 
$300 
137 
163 
Soybeans 
(40 bu/ac) 
$260 
105 
156 
One option is to more closely align support rates among crops. Data in Table 3 
indicates that the corn target price support is highest relative to full economic cost of 
production, encouraging overproduction of com relative to other crops. Soybean producers 
for the most part do not seek target prices so raising soybean supports is not the answer. 
And grain, wheat, and cotton producers would not want their target prices reduced to the 
level (zero) provided soybean producers. 
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One attractive alternative to respond to market signals is by combining all payments 
into a single base from past history. A lump-sum payment would continue each year no 
matter what farmers produced but the payment would be reduced at a preset rate over 
time. The Boschwitz-Boren Bill of 1985 contained such a provision with payments to be 
reduced SO pereent in five years. A less rapid rate of reduction in payments, say 3 percent 
per year, might be politically more palatable. Because decoupling of payments would rule 
out the acreage reduction program, production control could be limited to the CRP alone. 
The market could handle residual adjustments given the lower excess capacity projected for 
the 1990s than characterized the 1980s (Tweeten, January 1989). A weakness (non-
targeting) and advantage (decoupling) is that the new payment base would not be 
responsive to individual crop prices. Deficien'Y payments could be based on deviations 
from a target price index of covered commodities including soybeans. 
Table 3. 'Tetal Economic Cost of Production, Target Price (Loan for Soybeans), 
and Support Price as Percent of Production Cost, Selected Crops, U.S. 
Item Soybeau Com Wheat Cotti21 
1986 1987 1986 1987 1986 1987 1986 1987 
($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/lb) 
Total Economic Cost 4.83 4.95 2.01 2.05 3.92 3.64 0.75 0.63 
Target Price '(loan 
for soybean$;) 4.77 4.77 3.03 3.03 4.38 4.38 0.81 0.79 
As Percent of 
Economic Oost 99 96 151 148 118 120 108 126 
Source: U.S. Department df Agriculture (February 1989 and June 1989). 
A related alternative is a payment base on each farm which responds to market 
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price but not to production of that farm. The proposal is similar to Secretary of Agriculture 
Brannan's plan of the late 1940s and to a proposal by Luther Tweeten before the Senate 
Agriculture Committee in 1985. The proposal is a modification of the current deficiency 
payment. The direct payment base quantity would be current program yield times the crop 
base for each commodity and would not change with current production. Production 
controls would be terminated and producers would receive the market price for output. 
Their payment would be the difference between the target price and market price 
multiplied by the quantity base for each commodity. Payment limitations per recipient and 
a schedule of future reductions in target price and/ or payment base could be established 
by policymakers. 
In short, phasing out of production controls in favor of direct income transfers to 
farmers is one means of promoting a market-centered agriculture and of focusing benefits 
on specific groups at minimal lost income to the nation. Still to be sorted out by the 
political process would be thorny issues of appropriate targeting of benefits, acceptance of 
"welfare" payments by producers, vulnerability of payments to political whims, and 
stabilizing food supplies to consumers. 
Environmental Issues 
An emerging group of farm policy actors -- environmentalists -- were primarily 
responsible for the soil conservation provisions in the 1985 farm bill. Four provisions 
were the strongest commitment ever to environmental concerns since omnibus farm 
commodity legislation was first enacted in 1933: (1) conservation reserve - farmers are paid 
for taking land out of production for 10 years; (2) sodbuster - farm program benefits are 
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denied; to; producers who break out new, highly-erodible land; (3) swampbuster - program 
benefits are denied to farmers who convert natural wetlands to. cmp: land; and (4} 
conservation compliance - program benefits are denied to farmers who. do not follow an 
approved conservation plan on erosion-prone land While farmers would like some 
relaxation· of smne provisio~ only minor changes. appear likely.. The. major o.utlines of 
society's policy with: respect to soil erosion are in place. Only a sllhstantial surge is food 
prices would appear to be a strong enough factor to alta this mmmitmem: •. 
In. dte t99Qfarm bill, environmentalists will focus more 011 chemical "c<mtaminatioa" 
of the environment. Widespread public CODCem o.ver the role agrieultural chemicals play 
in pollution' of ground and surface water is being· continually reinfon:ed by &om pGF 
headlines that underscoie. envinmmental degradation:. toxic waste, oil spills, Bid the 
1'lle eiwiroomental community maintains that fam.1; poliq enem.uages farm.ing. 
piactices CDD.tributimg. ta. environmental depadation. This is- part of a broader eCill'Xem 
with. tle euironmeatal effects of madem fuming practices on the long:-term hattb of the 
bit>splilere. 
Thtree incomsis1lencies of farm poticy wint eiwironmeataft p>rotect:Wn are Slted Firstt 
by increasing fann illcome, fa.rm commodity programs. provide capital eo im.UDt:Wes t& use 
more inputs. Second, farmers respond to supply comet programs by setting. aside drefr 
marginal aoplaad amt applying more land--substituting mputs such a fertilizers, and 
tlSed fer en>ps deelined l l.3 percent, reflecting increased. acreage set asides. In contrast,. 
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planting decisions to determine base acres which in tum determine a farmer's government 
payment encourages farmers to maximize current program crop acreage. Consequently, 
planting of non-program crops such as legumes and forages is discouraged. Use of these 
crops in rotation with program crops is a key practice in low-input, sustainable agricultural 
systems using less chemicals than conventional planting rotations. 
Several proposals address these problems. One is targeting land retirement programs 
to environmentally sensitive land. One land targeting program is to expand the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) to include environmentally sensitive ground, notably 
that which plays an important role in ground or surface water quality. This expanded role 
may require increasing the current 45 million-acre limit on the Conservation Reserve 
Program. Senator Wyche Fowler's Fann Conservation and Water Protection Act of 1989 
contains these provisions. 
Expanding the number of acres in the Conservation Reserve Program would be 
costly. Thirty million acres are already in the CRP. These are probably low-program-cost 
acres because they had the most to gain from entry into CRP. Furthermore, as the number 
of CRP acres increase, supply of commodities decline, thereby increasing price. The higher 
the commodity price, the higher the cost of getting farmers to forego production. Thus, an 
expanded CRP could result in substantially larger federal budgetary outlays and could 
increase the price of food. The latter may work against long-term environment efforts if 
consumers are intolerant of higher food prices. Expanding the CRP may diminish the local 
economic base to a critical level, especially in rural counties already enrolling large 
acreages. 
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er-0pping easements from farmers on environmentally sensitive land. Farmers could use the 
land for hay. pasture, or other l<>w..chemical, noncrop, low erosion ases. Mowing such uses 
essentially limits the budget cost to the d.iffel'eftce :in economic retums between the program 
"'.,._.,:_.,.., ... -..:i •L-.- .. l•---•~- ~ -n • a..-nftn ·· --A ;a,.,., -1-:" ·• aop ru:&ICL- lllil&U ,~ ~UAU·v:t;; uses. _., mOWJDg -,....:uc or g:razmg AJ.w ,,.,, \JU.WU1fl1Dg 
....._ " ~ f "th ...J.. "ft•:..J,11 of • •-·1 ...n.m .... 10.e... . • ·• ... i.._ we .carr"" •O pat'ments ·wt we '.M&ll.\.. . an envmmmen:L4l ~c  pro~ ua;; crop 
easement would entail less Treasury cost per unit of crop production removed than wauld 
other voluntary div.ersion pmgrams. However., hay and eattle producers might view sudl 
easements with alarm. Restrictions on the use of CRP and 5et~aside ground in part reflect 
the lobb~ efforti of farm groupi representing these producers. Use of long-term 
easements to retire land above the 3() million acres in CRP might be Viewed as :a 
re.a.son.able wmpromise between livestock interests which got grazing and haying restricted 
on existing CRP land and the local economy which would benefit from the grazing and 
haying allowed by crop easements. 
Another targeting option is to supplement or replace the Conservation Compliance 
provision with an Environmental Compliance provision. This provision would require 
producers who wish to remain eligible for commodity program benefits to follow an 
approved environmental plan (regulating timing, quantities, application methods., etc. for 
chemicals) on land contributing to groundwater contamination in areas of low water quality. 
Expanding conservation compliance to regulate use of chemicals would create administrative 
difficµlties of ensuring compliance and increase the cost of participating in farm programs. 
However, .similar problems have been handled under the current conservation compliance 
program. Farmers may opt out of the program, compromising supply control and 
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environmental objectives. Simultaneously reducing soil erosion and chemical use may be 
incompatible goals with current technology on row-crop intensive farms. For example, no-
till can significantly reduce soil erosion, but may increase chemical runoff due to the need 
to use more herbicides for effective weed kill. 
Farm program benefits could be re-targeted from large producers to "environmentally 
safe" producers. The difficulty in monitoring low-chemical practices and the potential for 
substantial political resistance from farm groups suggests use of a less restrictive approach. 
Allowing rotations without losing crop history might reduce the use of costly chemicals, but 
the amount of acres a farmers would plant to high income crops would also decline. 
Participation might be low. Another confounding issue is justice for farmers who already 
practice rotations with legumes and forages because of livestock feed needs or personal 
commitment to rotations. By including in bases nonprogram crops currently in rotations, 
this provision could lead to a large increase in base acres and farm program cost. 
In summary, concerns about the environmental effects of agricultural production 
practices are probably at a historical high. Alternatives include changes in farming practices 
by farmers, the tying of farm income and price support programs to environmental goals, 
and/or the regulation of farming practices through non-traditional farm agencies such as 
the Environmental Protection Agency. Commercial farmers and environmentalists together 
potentially can wield political power of steamroller proportions. Sound principles and 
reliable data are needed to channel that power toward constructive ends. 
A satisfactory data base on the environmental impact of modern farming techniques 
does not exist. Definition of such terms as "environmentally sensitive", identification of 
tolerable levels of chemical residues, and effective means of monitoring a farmer's 
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compliance with environmental programs will all require substantially more Tesearch if the 
..enacted .programs are not to cause more problems than they solve.6 Thus, increased 
,research funding seem necessary if prudent and effective policy relative to farm chemical 
practices is to be enacted. 
Other Topics 
Reserve Stocks and Stability 
An important accomplishment of farm commodity programs has ·been to reduce 
variability in farm prices and incomes and in food prices and quantity. Decoupling and 
reliance on direct payments do not stabilize food prices and quantities. The private trade 
alone may not ·bold stocks sufficient to meet felt needs of the public for food security. 
Whether government incentives are needed to encourage the private trade to hold sufficient 
buffer stocks is a hotly debated issue among economists. While the private trade may not 
hold adequate stocks, it is possible that government interventions to stabilize supplies will 
continue t<> entail higher social costs than did the market failure they were intended to 
correct. 
Options include (1) a government-held emergency reserve, (2) a farmer-owned-
reserve, (3) Commodity Credit Corporation reserves, and (4) a payment to the private 
trade to store buffer stocks from year to year. An example of the latter would be a 
government payment of 3 cents per bushel per month of buffer stocks stored by the private 
~ soil conservation programs of the 198S farm bill wcie based in part on the tm National :Resource Inventories data 
collected by the Soil Conservation Service and ycan; of research by private and univelSity scientists (for example, sec National 
Association of Conscivation Districts, Nadonal Agricullural Lands Study). 
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trade. No acquisition or release policy would be imposed. Decisions regarding when to 
acquire or release stocks would be made by the private trade. Payment limits could be set 
for individuals and firms. The storage program could be confined to food grains; livestock 
feeding and export markets offer considerable buffer for other commodities. 
Disaster Assistance 
Less than one-half of eligible acreage participates in multiple-peril crop insurance 
despite subsidies from government. Many producers do not participate because they feel 
confident the government will provide assistance in the case of a disaster. The 1988 
experience of large government disaster payments to drought victims reinforced that belief. 
All disaster payments including subsidized crop insurance encourage crop production 
in high risk areas better suited for grazing or recreation. Disaster payments transfer funds 
from low wealth taxpayers to high wealth producers quite capable of purchasing insurance. 
A reaffirmation in new legislation of the principle of no disaster payments in counties where 
multiple-peril crop insurance is available will lack credibility after the 1988 experience. An 
alternative is to require all participants in commodity programs to hold multiple-peril 
insurance, but that option lacks political appeal. The 1990 farm legislation is unlikely to 
resolve the highly important issue of how to reduce risk to farmers and consumers at low 
cost to the Treasury and low infringement on managerial prerogatives of producers. 
Program Complexity 
Farm policy has become too complex to legislate. Congress has responded with 
commodity legislation giving the Secretary of Agriculture administrative discretion to impose 
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any one of a number of policies ranging from, for example, mandatory controls to direct 
payments for grains. Programs are now so complex that few farm operators can interpret 
the rules without professional assistance. This complexity awards economic rent to 
managers with legal minds and "taxes" other managers. Opportunities are enhanced for 
economic rents from fraud, special favors, and other forms of corruption in administration 
of programs. The next farm bill needs to search for options reducing complexity while 
increasing flexibility of programs to address legitimate concerns of an unstable farm 
economy. Space limitations preclude addressing that topic here. 
The Sugar Program 
The nation is rapidly approaching the need for export subsidies to dispose of excess 
sugar produced because of price supports set well above world price levels. The U.S. has 
strongly criticized the European Community for a similar policy and now needs to make 
adjustments. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is expected to rule that U.S. 
sugar quota preferences for politically favored nations violate the organization's rules. The 
U.& will need to decide whether to continue the current program of high sugar prices all 
the time or a more market-oriented policy giving high prices only some of the time. Again, 
space limitations predude adequately addressing these issues, but an appropriate place to 
begin is with lower price support and tariff protection for the industry. 
Conclusions 
The economic environment in farming as we debate a farm bill for the 1990s is 
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• 
• much more rosy than that for the 1985 farm bill. The outlook for a more favorable supply-
demand balance and less need to reduce excess capacity and stocks creates opportunities 
to revise program objectives and to lower the government profile in agriculture. 
Three major changes in FSA85 are needed to make it applicable to the 1990s: 
1. More flexibility in cropping. A return to the Normal Cropland Acreage (NCA) 
of the early 1970s, the preferred approach, would require producers to set 
aside a prescribed portion of their cropland to soil conserving uses and allow 
them to plant whatever they wish on remaining acres. 
An option to reduce economic distortions created by deficiency payments is 
to lump all payments into a single sum which would be provided regardless 
of production of any one crop but could be used initially to pay farmers to 
divert a portion of Normal Cropland Acreage to soil conserving uses when 
diversion is needed. 
2. Reduce budget exposure. Chief options are to reduce deficiency payments by 
reducing target prices say 2-5 percent per year or by reducing base acres on 
which deficiency payments are made by a like percentage. Loan rates can be 
set at 75 percent of a 5-year moving average of past market prices. 
3. Address environmental issues. Many contend that current commodity programs 
are outdated, have outlived their usefulness, and are middle-class welfare the 
nation can no longer afford. If there is truth in these contentions but 
programs are to continue, then at least, the argument goes, the public has a 
right to expect something in return from producers electing to receive 
program benefits. Under the conditionality of environmental compliance, a 
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farmer participating in a commodity program would be required to follow 
an approved soil and water conservation plan, including provisions for 
groundwater quality protection.. 
Other important issues worthy of careful attention in 1990 legislation but treated 
only briefly in this report include instability in agriculture (including provision of disaster 
payments), program complexity, and sugar supports. 
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